The US Army Nuclear Surety Program, outlined in AR 50-5 and AR 50-5-1, was designed to ensure the safety
and security of nuclear weapons, equipment, and documents. The variety of US Army nuclear capable or
nuclear support units, their individual missions, geographic locations, an available resources make it impossible
to prescribe a generic OPSEC program or set of OPSEC measures which will adequately protect all units.
Regulatory guidance and doctrinal manuals provide Cl personnel with guidelines to follow in developing
OPSEC programs for these units. This lesson does not address support offered to these units through Personnel
Security Investigations or specific types of Cl Investigations/Services. The following discussion concerns
specific considerations and types of OPSEC support available to special weapons units.
Conforming to prescribed criteria lone does not ensure the security of special weapons or the defense of fixed
storage sites. OPSEC planners must also consider any unit or activity to have unique characteristics such as
local threat; host nation constraints; friendly forces available; type of special weapons; local terrain; number,
type and configuration of storage structures as well as the structure locations. Prescribed criteria and site
characteristics should be addressed and integrated into OPSEC planning. Redundant and monotonous routines
inherent in security force duties, for example, provide an advantage to threat forces. Because of the vast
number of regulations and other doctrine concerning special weapons, it can be expected that these operational
patterns abound. Each will have to be considered carefully to ensure that operational effectiveness is not being
sacrificed to security regulations. JCS procedures and numerous national level agency regulations must be
consulted to ensure that recommended OPSEC measures do not unduly restrict a higher headquarters or special
staff elements within a headquarters from exercising their oversight functions. In addition to providing detailed
threat estimates and assisting with OPSEC planning, there are other areas through which CI provides OPSEC
support to special weapons units.
Special Access Programs. Special access programs (SAP) impose a "need to know" or other types of access
restrictions to CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET information. Comprehensive application of
OPSEC principles constitute a key factor in the successful execution of SAP. The SAP most commonly
associated with special weapons is the Personal Reliability Program (PRP). The immediate commander of the
unit or activity involved with the nuclear surety program is ultimately responsible for the proper implementation
of the PRP. Cl, as a supporting agency, must assist the commander with the continuing evaluation of
individuals assigned or being assigned to nuclear weapons duties, and must ensure that all potentially
disqualifying information is forwarded to the commander for consideration. The decision to qualify or
disqualify the individual from the program is the responsibility of that individual's immediate commander. AR
380-67, Personnel Security, and AR 50-5, Nuclear Surety, offer guidelines in this area. A Cl agent charged
with providing support to these units should be familiar with the provisions of both of these documents.
Threat. In general, closer contact must be maintained with special weapons units than other types of units due
to the heightened threat which they face. These units are prime targets for foreign intelligence services;
adversary forces during periods of hostility; and for various terrorist and violent political groups worldwide.
Hostile intelligence services and terrorist groups can be expected to reconnoiter both primary and secondary
targets and select those targets which offer them the maximum opportunity for success. Information passed to
these groups, often unknowingly, by unit personnel, may be used in their planning efforts. Therefore, the
security education programs in these units must be strong. Cl personnel should provide guidance to ensure that
an effective training program is developed and maintained.
Nuclear Accident or Incident Response. In the event of a nuclear accident or incident, when sabotage is not
indicated, Cl personnel must be prepared to assist the on-site commander with investigations as well as OPSEC
support. Depending on the nature of the incident, various agencies may be involved in the investigation. At a
minimum, Cl personnel will provide continued threat updates to the on-site commander. Additionally, advice
should be offered to ensure that operation EEFI as well as any accident/incident specific EEFI are not
compromised. Ideally, this involvement will begin when contingency plans are prepared, well in advance of
any actual incidents. Contingency plans should include adequate OPSEC measures in addition to providing for