Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces. Three bright orange circles, of similar size, placed on the
same axis, the distance between each circle being one radius. (GP I, annex I, art. 16.)
Stratagems and Tactics
Ruses. (FM 27-10, para. 48). Injuring the enemy by legitimate deception (abiding by the law of war--actions are in good
faith). Examples of ruses:
Naval Tactics. A common naval tactic is to rig disguised vessels or dummy ships, e.g., to make warships appear as
merchant vessels.
Land Warfare. Creation of fictitious units by planting false information, putting up dummy installations, false radio
transmissions, using a small force to simulate a large unit. (FM 27-10, para. 51.)
Gulf War - Coalition: Coalition forces, specifically XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps, used deception cells to
create the impression that they were going to attack near the Kuwaiti boot heel, as opposed to the "left hook" strategy
actually implemented. XVIII Airborne Corps set up "Forward Operating Base Weasel" near the boot heel, consisting of a
phony network of camps manned by several dozen soldiers. Using portable radio equipment, cued by computers, phony
radio messages were passed between fictitious headquarters. In addition, smoke generators and loudspeakers playing
tape-recorded tank and truck noises were used, as were inflatable Humvees and helicopters. Rick Atkinson, Crusade,
331-33 (1993).
Use of Enemy Property. Enemy property may be used to deceive under the following conditions:
Uniforms. Combatants may wear enemy uniforms but cannot fight in them. Note, however, that military personnel
not wearing their own uniform lose their PW status if captured and risk being treated as spies (FM 27-10, para. 54, 74;
NWP 1-14M, para. 12.5.3; AFP 110-31, 8-6.) For listing of examples of the use of enemy uniforms, see W. Hays Parks,
Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 77-78 (1990).
Colors. The U.S. position regarding the use of enemy flags is consistent with its practice regarding uniforms, i.e., the
U.S. interprets the "improper use" of a national flag (HR, art. 23(f).) to permit the use of national colors and insignia of
enemy as a ruse as long as they are not employed during actual combat (FM 27-10, para. 54; NWP 1-14M, para 12.5.).
Note the Protocol I position on this issue below.
Equipment. Must remove all enemy insignia in order to fight with it. Captured supplies: may seize and use if state
property. Private transportation, arms, and ammunition may be seized, but must be restored and compensation fixed
when peace is made. (HR, art. 53).
Protocol I. GP I, Article 39(2) prohibits virtually all use of these enemy items. (See NPW 1-14M, para 12.5.3.)
Article 39 prohibits the use in an armed conflict of enemy flags, emblems, uniforms, or insignia while engaging in attacks
or "to shield, favor, protect or impede military operations." The U.S. does not consider this article reflective of customary
law. This article, however, expressly does not apply to naval warfare, thus the customary rule that naval vessels may fly
enemy colors, but must hoist true colors prior to an attack, lives on. (GP I, art 39(3); NWP 1-14M, para. 12.5.1.)
Use of Property. (See Elyce Santere, From Confiscation to Contingency Contracting: Property Acquisition on or
Near the Battlefield, 124 Mil. L. Rev. 111 (1989).) Confiscation - permanent taking without compensation; Seizure -
taking with payment or return after the armed conflict; Requisition - appropriation of private property by occupying force
with compensation as soon as possible; Contribution - a form of taxation under occupation law.
Psychological Operations. Gulf War - U.S. PSYOPS leaflet program - PSYOPS units distributed over 29 million leaflets
to Iraqi forces. The themes of the leaflets were the "futility of resistance; inevitability of defeat; surrender; desertion and
defection; abandonment of equipment; and blaming the war on Saddam Hussein." It was estimated that nearly 98% of all
Iraqi prisoners acknowledged having seen a leaflet; 88% said they believed the message; and 70% said the leaflets
affected their decision to surrender. Adolph, PSYOP: The Gulf War Force Multiplier, Army Magazine 16 (December
1992).
Chapter 2
15
Law of War
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