of square kilometers. Since the addition of the airplane and helicopter to the
arsenal of war, the battlefield must now be viewed in terms of cubic kilometers.
Airspace itself has no reference points to guide the analyst, and all evidence of
air activity is erased seconds after the activity occurs. Airspace analysis must
therefore tie air events to time and to the ground. Because of this requirement,
it is often difficult to establish NAIs, TAIs, and air operations DPs. It is
therefore critical that aircraft maximum service ceilings, minimum operating
altitudes for both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, and the maximum effective ranges
of air defense weapons systems be integrated into airspace analysis.
Although weather and terrain will dictate available air avenues of approach, to a
degree, a detailed knowledge of fixed and rotary-wing attack profiles has the
greatest impact on determining the air avenues of approach to air-associated IPB.
The avenue of approach for attack helicopters employing a LO-LO-HI attack profile
will differ significantly from that of a high speed fighter-bomber flying a similar
profile. The same avenue of approach will differ even more significantly if the
fighter-bomber shifts to a HI-HI-LO profile. The analyst and the commander must
therefore be acutely aware that as aircraft have been developed, terrain has been
considered, and attack profiles have been developed to provide the aircraft with a
As the commanders are forced to consider all aspects of aviation operations, they
must be aware of friendly and enemy airlift, airborne, air assault, air insertion,
and air defense capabilities and limitations. They receive support in this area
from air defense officers at all echelons and levels.
Although the G2 or S2 serves as the air-associated IPB coordinator at all levels,
he must rely heavily on the air defense and aviation officers to supplement his
knowledge of aviation capabilities and air defense unit deployment. It is
therefore critical that both the aviation and the air defense officers have at
least the same level of IPB knowledge as the G2 or S2 for their functional areas.
It is also critical that both air defense and intelligence personnel have the same
level of knowledge of the air threat, and aviation and intelligence personnel have
the same degree of knowledge on the air defense threat. It is especially critical
for the air defense and aviation officers to participate in the IPB staff
integration process within the unit CP, and to assist in the refinement of the
airspace analysis and air operations process.
IPB for air defense, close air support (CAS), and other aviation-related operations
is neither difficult nor significantly different from IPB for other types of
operations, provided the effort is based on a thorough understanding of the third
battlefield dimension. The basic process remains the same. However, the focus of
the effort must shift to cover