b. Equipment design considerations can be further researched in AR 10-52.
The purpose of these considerations is the same for all items entering the Army
Development Program.
Some of the equipment design considerations are listed
below:
(1) Make necessary decisions relating to EP capability early in the
system development program.
(2) Give proper consideration to the expected threat environment during
the operational life of the system.
(3) Consider operational needs for protection and the associated needs
for program costs.
(4) Make a conscious decision on the desired level of protection.
c. Training is a significant tenet in the effective and reliable
employment of EP. Operational tactics and techniques which can be employed to
reduce system vulnerability to EW or to overcome hostile EW actives include,
but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Operating a system at the minimum power level
and
band
width
consistent with successful operation and operational doctrine.
(2) Practicing emission control (EMCON) to reduce exposure to hostile
intercept systems.
EMCON is the selective and controlled use of
electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize C2 capabilities while
minimizing, for OPSEC, detection by enemy sensors.
(3) Off-tuning receivers to reduce effects of electronic jamming in
those cases where a continuous tuning capability is possible.
(4) Switching to alternate circuits, frequencies, or means, when EA
prevents successful operation on primary facility.
(5) Assessing potential EW vulnerabilities in relation to the expected
hostile EW threat.
(6) Developing plans for the deployment, employment, concealment, or
replacement of highly vulnerable facilities to ensure effective employment when
needed.
(7) Recognizing
and
reporting
meaconing,
intrusion,
jamming,
and
d. Signal security (SIGSEC) is a generic term which includes both
communication security (COMSEC) and electronic security (ELSEC).
SIGSEC is
distinct from EP. SIGSEC is aimed at countering foreign SIGINT operations. EP
is directed toward countering foreign EW (ES and EA) operations. On the other
hand, some EP operational tactics and techniques are similar to the
related.
Both contribute to the continued effective and secure use of the
electromagnetic spectrum by friendly forces.
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IS3007